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    ROME AND MOSCOW, A STEP FURTHER 
By Thomas Bremer 
 
Dr. Thomas Bremer (Roman Catholic) is professor of ecumenical theology 
and Peace Studies at the Catholic Theological  Faculty of the University of 
Münster, Germany. He received his education in theology and Slavic languages 
at Munich and Münster; in 1980/81 he studied  at the Orthodox Theological 
School in Belgrade, Serbia.  He has published several books and many articles on 
Orthodox theology, on the situation of churches in Eastern Europe (Russia, 
Ukraine, Former Yugoslavia) and on churches in conflict.  
 
 Since the beginning of 2002, the relations between the Catholic and Russian Orthodox 
Churches (ROC) have reached a new low. The background is the decision of the Catholic Church 
to raise the four administratura apostolica [apostolic administrations] in Russia to bishoprics.  
The Church has also decided to establish an ecclesiastical province, with the archbishop of 
Moscow as metropolitan.  This decision as well as the way in which it was prepared and carried 
out elicited strong criticism. The general functioning of the Catholic Church in Russia was also 
included in the criticism. The accusation of proselytism with which the Russian Orthodox 
Church has long reproached the Catholic Church was raised very vehemently once again. 
 Events need to be viewed and understood in a complex context. After centuries of 
dependency on the state and decades of the most horrible persecution, the Russian Orthodox 
Church is seeking to define its relationship with the government and Russian society. This is not 
to say that both state and society themselves are in any way stable or firmly established. The 
Catholic Church sees new spheres of influence in the formerly Communist Eastern European 
countries, while it also has the opportunity for the first time in many years to minister to the 
faithful within Russia itself who see themselves as Catholics. At the same time, the Catholic 
Church offers spiritual solace to such people as have grown up without religion and are now 
seeking religious dimensions in their lives. For the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), this is an 
unacceptable and forbidden alienation of religious people who are “potentially Orthodox.” On its 
“canonical territory” the Russian Orthodox Church asserts it is the only church that ought to be 
permitted to preach the gospel to ethnic Russians. This concept of “canonical territory” is 
rejected by the Catholic Church. Added to this is a further problem: almost all of the Catholic 
clergy and members of religious orders in Russia are foreigners, primarily from Poland. For the 
ROC this fact calls forth negative historical associations, because Polish overlords in earlier 
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centuries tried to conquer Moscow and exercise hegemony over Russia. This is something the 
Russians have always connected with Catholic attempts at conversion in Russia. The fact that the 
Eastern boundary of Poland and the corresponding Western border of Russia, or the erstwhile 
Soviet Union, have changed many times has contributed to the continually disputed status of 
many areas. Finally, the contemporary struggle must be viewed in the context of Catholic-
Orthodox relations on the global level. These relations, too, have been in serious crisis for 
several years. This is connected, but not exclusively, with the events surrounding the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. (Here we need to mention most prominently the autonomy of the Ukraine with 
the concomitant revival of the Greek-Catholic church.) 
 Therefore this is not a question of a conflict that centers around an easily defined issue. 
Every statement and action has numerous implications that make the search for a solution more 
difficult. In the following pages, we intend to delineate the course of events, then examine and 
evaluate the main arguments on both sides. Finally, we will consider perspectives from which we 
can envision rapprochement between the two churches. 
 
1. The Events or Who Started This? 
 In the Soviet Union there were two regions in which a majority of the population was 
Catholic: Lithuania, whose people were almost exclusively Roman Catholic, and the Western 
Ukraine, where the majority of the people are Greek Catholic. There were also Catholics of the 
Roman rite in Latvia, in the Western areas of Byelorussia and the Ukraine) as well as in those 
parts of the country where Germans traditionally lived or to which they and other Catholics had 
been deported during the [Stalinist] Terror. In Lithuania (as well as in Latvia), there was a 
Catholic hierarchy during the Communist era. But of course it was scarcely free to function, 
because of persecution. The Greek [Ukrainian] Catholic Church was forbidden and repressed in 
the Ukraine and could only eke out an underground existence. In all the other areas of the USSR 
there were no regular church structures on the Catholic side. 
 This state of affairs changed with Perestroika. Now the Greek [Ukrainian] Catholic 
Church was permitted to enjoy a legal existence and the Roman Catholic Church was granted the 
option of founding new congregations. When the USSR collapsed in 1991 the Vatican 
reorganized church relations in the countries that emerged from the collapse. The church set up 
first two and finally (1994) four apostolic administraturas in the Russian federation, specifically 
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in Moscow, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and Saratov. At the same time, Catholic congregational life and 
charitable entities were created with strong financial support from Western countries. The new 
structure of Catholic Church organization was strongly criticized by the ROC. People questioned 
the necessity for such large structures, and speculated that their goal was actually the conversion 
of ethnic Russians. But these accusations were overshadowed by the fact that major conflict 
between both churches revolved around events in the Western Ukraine. Above all, the accusation 
of proselytism referred to the massive numbers of (formal) Orthodox church members who went 
over to the newly legalized Greek Catholic Church. The ROC in Russia also disapproved of the 
activities of the Roman Catholic Church, but these were not the crux of the controversy. At this 
time, there were always official encounters between both churches, a noteworthy fact in the face 
of the great reserve of the ROC about ecumenism in recent years. 
 A further encounter on a higher level was planned for February 21, 2002. Cardinal 
Kasper, the new president of the Papal Council on Christian Unity, was expected to visit 
Moscow for the first time in his new capacity, and be received by the  Office of External Church 
Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate. A few days before this, on February 11th, it was 
announced in Rome that the administraturas apostolica in Russia were being elevated to the 
status of bishoprics, that the administratura of Moscow was becoming an archbishopric and that 
a church province was being created. Noteworthy was the fact that the bishoprics were not 
named according to their geographic location but according to the patron saints of the respective 
cathedrals. With this move the Catholic side wanted to make it clear that they did not seek to 
create any structures parallel to those of the ROC. 
 The Russian Orthodox Church was informed by the nuncio very shortly before the public 
announcement of the decision in Rome. On top of that, he brought this information at a time 
when neither Patriarch Aleksij nor the chief of the Foreign Office, Metropolitan Kirill, were in 
Moscow. The ROC reacted with a sharply formulated declaration and a refusal to receive the 
visit from Cardinal Kasper. In March 2002 Kasper published an article in the well known Jesuit 
newspaper, Civita Cattolica. The Moscow patriarchy responded to this with a declaration entitled 
“Catholic Proselytism among the Russian Orthodox Populace.” It was published at the end of 
June along with an explanation from  Metropolitan Kirill. This “Information” was a response to a 
request from the Catholic side of the controversy for concrete examples to justify ROC 
accusations. After that, there came a further exchange of notes and explanations; Cardinal 
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Kasper and the Catholic archbishop of Moscow, Kondrusiewicz, took positions (the former with 
a “Clarification,” in which he commented upon the concrete accusations contained in the 
“Information.”)  The ROC then responded again to these statements. Finally, Metropolitan 
Filaret of Minsk published a personal theological explanation as a response to the March article 
by the President of the Council on Unity, in which he particularly referred to the principle of 
canonical territory. Events were further complicated by the fact that the Bishop of Irkutsk, 
Mazur, a Polish citizen, had his visa revoked and was sent back to Poland. The Foreign Office 
and finally President Putin himself answered the complaints from Rome and Warsaw by 
declaring that the refusal to permit Mazur entry had been justified. Meanwhile, some seven 
Roman Catholic priests (Poles, Irishmen, Italians) had their permission of stay in the Russian 
Federation revoked. The ROC has declared that these acts were undertaken by state authorities 
because of legal reasons and that the Church does not have anything to do with these measures. 
In late 2002, Cardinal Kasper was invited to a conference in Minsk and met with Metropolitan 
Filaret, who is a member of the Synod of the ROC and who is regarded as open-minded. At the 
present moment,  (March 2003), there appears  to be no activity in the relations between both 
churches at the top level. 
 
2. The Arguments or Who is Right? 
 What are the arguments being used to prove the points on both sides of this dispute? 
Basically, they can be divided into two groups, namely, the arguments referring to the formal 
aspect of the controversy and those on the margins of the issues. 
 The accusation that the kind of communication given here was not in the spirit of earlier 
relations between the parties has been raised primarily by the Russian side. The fact that there 
was no preliminary information or a consultation prior to the decision, although there had been a 
series of occasions on which this could have been done, is mentioned repeatedly. “This is the 
way war is declared” is a statement made in a contribution from the deputy chief of the foreign 
office of ROC.  In the explanations, one can clearly discern that the dissatisfaction on the part of 
the ROC originates in the special significance that has always been placed on relations with the 
Catholic Church. In spite of difficulties, whenever the Russian Orthodox Church exhorted the 
laity about the numerous changes in today’s world (and here one may surely also add: difficult 
ecumenical relations on the international level), the Catholic Church was always seen as a 
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reliable partner that would never compromise with secular positions concerning these 
fundamental questions. This alliance (that was perhaps never perceived with such clarity on the 
Catholic side) is now viewed by the ROC as dissolved. The regret about this fact is clearly 
discernible in official ROC documents. 
 A further reproach from the “formal” perspective refers to a comment by Cardinal 
Kasper. The President of the Council on Christian Unity is commenting on the ROC’s fear of the 
pastoral efficiency of the Catholic Church, of its departure from the Constantinian era, in which 
the ROC still finds itself, and of the enlightenment which has not yet dawned on the ROC. These 
comments have been noted with thorough care and not without a little bitterness by the ROC. 
Even if there may be good reasons for these assertions, nonetheless, one ought to question 
whether it was prudent to utter statements about one’s own superiority. The ROC then also used 
the same polemical niveau when it warned that if Catholic clerical efficiency is as overwhelming 
as all that, perhaps the Catholic Church should apply it to Western European countries, where the 
churches stand empty. 
 The Russian Orthodox Church considers it important to view the relationship between the 
ROC and the Catholic church as “sister churches” (whereby it traces this concept, unhistorically, 
to Vatican II, where it was in fact not used for Catholic-Orthodox relations). For the Russian 
side, this designation means that the Christian world between Rome and the East is equally 
divided, so that therefore the concept of “canonical territory” is justified. Each church, the 
argument asserts, is permitted to engage in missionary activity only in “its” territory. In the 
domain of the other church, one also has the right to exercise pastoral care over church members 
of one’s own denomination. This concept is vehemently rejected by the Catholic side, which 
asserts that the message of the gospels is directed to all people, and therefore, there can be no 
limitations. It is of course incorrect to say that the Catholic Church is not acquainted with the 
idea of ecclesiastical “territory.” The territorial principle is one of the canonical foundations of 
Catholic Church structure. Clearly one sees here (as also in other examples) that both sides 
understand something different in interpreting the same concept. The interpretation of the ROC 
reveals a larger ecumenical closeness that was considered possible. The ROC sees in the 
Catholic and Orthodox churches the representatives, or perhaps the successors, of the Ancient 
Church. (That the churches of the Reformed tradition fall by the wayside here is another matter 
and is barely mentioned in discussions by either side.) So the ROC and the Catholic Church are 
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both part of one church. According to the old church tradition, however, it was actually not 
permissible for a patriarchate to set up congregations and bishoprics in the territory of another 
patriarchate. Thus, we can see that the Catholic Church accepts the factual and concrete situation 
of today’s multiple confessional society (which can basically also include a kind of competitive 
relationship), whereas for the ROC, the old church patriarchal structure continues to have 
supreme validity. As concerns the statements of the Second Vatican Council about the 
relationship of the Catholic Church to other churches, and specifically, to the Orthodox 
Churches, it would be entirely conceivable that the Catholic Church could adopt a position that 
would approach that of the ROC. 
 In the Catholic position two points are emphasized. One is that the Church concerns itself 
primarily with Catholics in Russia, those that come from the Catholic tradition and in many cases 
could only practice that faith now that Communism has ended. The right of the Catholic Church 
to minister in this way is not disputed at all by the ROC. But the situation is different when we 
speak of people who come out of the Orthodox tradition, but were themselves perhaps never 
religious and have now found a (new) spiritual home in the Catholic Church. According to the 
Orthodox view, it is exclusively a matter for the Orthodox Church to make spiritual overtures to 
such people and lead them back to the faith of their forefathers. The Catholic side advances the 
principle of religious freedom, that is, every person has the right to decide freely for whatever 
religious faith he or she chooses. The Catholic Church does not actively seek converts in Russia 
(the Church argues) but it cannot turn away people who want to come to the Catholic Church. 
 From the perspective of the Russian Orthodox Church, the situation looks very different. 
This church alleges that the Catholic Church is actively propagandizing, perhaps even 
proselytizing here. According to its description of the problem, there are numerous evidences to 
this effect. One is the numerous small (Catholic) religious orders introduced into Russia who 
often have the word “missionaries” in their name or who were founded as missionary orders. For 
the ROC this is a clear indication that the Catholic Church is engaged in missionary activities in 
Russia. Furthermore, in published “information,” many cases are mentioned in which Russians 
(mostly children) have been won over to the Catholic Church by members of these Catholic 
religious communities. We need to say on this point that the name that designates a religious 
community by itself is not proof that its members are engaged in mission work, because these 
names have historical meaning. One can ask critically whether it is really necessary to have so 
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many religious communities living in a country with so few Catholics (whereby certainly it is 
important to note the enormous size of the country, as well as the fact that there is no native 
Catholic clergy).  In many cases, their activities can be viewed critically. Unfortunately, there 
has been, in fact, a series of unacceptable actions and public statements by representatives of the 
Catholic Church. Perhaps they were made with the best intentions, but they are just the kinds of 
things that serve to persistently disturb relations with the ROC. In his response to Metropolitan 
Kirill, Archbishop Kondrusiewicz did concede with sincere regret the validity of Orthodox 
criticism in some of these cases. We hear about other cases over and over. In this instance, it 
seems necessary for the ROC to limit its criticism to cases in which proselytism actually exists, 
and also that the Catholic Church for its part really take valid cases seriously and try to 
discontinue them. 
 The definition of “freedom of religion” remains in dispute, however. The ROC has 
declared that there will always be instances in which individuals convert from one church to 
another (in the West relatively many people from the Western church become Orthodox 
Christians). The ROC has nothing against this. But it does enjoin the Catholic Church not to 
systematically encourage conversions from Russian Orthodoxy. It asserts that in that situation, 
freedom of religion, which the ROC fundamentally recognizes, is in fact abrogated. So the 
question is, which kinds of behavior of one church or the other are seen as injurious to religious 
freedom? Basically speaking, both sides could presumably reach consensus on this point, if they 
would engage in dialogue about such questions. 
 Finally, we need to consider the historical argument put forth primarily by the Catholic 
side. It goes this way: there were Catholic structures in place in Russia very early in Russian 
history. The bishoprics that were already established from the time of Czarina Catherine the 
Great are used as evidence that the Catholic Church is rooted in Russian history. To this 
argument, one can say that complicated historical relationships need to be taken into account. 
Simply mentioning previously existing bishoprics does not prove anything (in fact, one may ask 
what those who emphasize that bishoprics existed earlier are trying to prove). As already 
indicated, the political boundaries between the geographical regions with Orthodox or Catholic 
populations have shifted repeatedly, so that it proved necessary to find a solution for each 
respective minority population. The ROC points to the fact that in the old Russia there were far 
more Catholics than there are now. (In fact, practically speaking, the actual number of Catholics 
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in Russia simply cannot be determined; the numbers given by Catholic and Russian authorities 
differ appreciably.) The historic bishoprics in Tiraspol and other locations are the result of the 
fact that regions inhabited by Catholics were located in Russia or that Catholic settlers found 
new homes in these areas. However these circumstances cannot be used as an argument in 
today’s situation because it was so fundamentally altered during the Soviet period. Numerous 
regions with Catholic populations now belong to other independent countries like the Ukraine, 
Byelorussia or Moldavia. On the other hand, there is a Catholic population in Siberia, which to 
all intents and purposes did not even exist there before they were sent there as punishment by the 
Stalinist regime. Therefore, it makes no sense to refer to history when there are completely 
different circumstances today. Furthermore, it is totally out of place to point to the events of the 
1920s. Bishoprics could be established at that time, but under circumstances that scarcely 
redound to the credit of Vatican policy on Eastern Europe. Thus, it is scarcely surprising that in 
its description of the situation, the ROC points to the fact that whenever Russia has been in a 
weak position, the Catholic Church has tried to exploit the situation. Therefore, Russian 
Orthodoxy interprets the present situation in the light of those historical experiences. But in 
effect, we should note that a historical justification of these questions does not help anyone. Even 
if one could prove beyond any doubt that this or that statement about historical events is entirely 
correct, nothing could be demonstrated or learned for today’s situation. 
 In summary, an overview of the arguments shows that on a whole series of subjects there 
is agreement: concrete events and actions are often judged in completely divergent ways. This 
truism has been clear since earlier phases of the relationship between Rome and Moscow, and 
perhaps emerged most clearly last summer over the Pope’s trip to the Ukraine and how both 
churches evaluated it. There is therefore a fundamental problem with mutual perceptions. And 
with this statement, we mention an important area that will be of great significance for future 
rapprochement. 
 
3. Perspectives or How Can We Go Forward? 
 Without a doubt, relations between both churches must be improved, or better said, 
started again from scratch on the highest level, that of church leadership. The ROC has always 
emphasized the fact that there are numerous Catholics and Catholic establishments with which it 
has good relations. Official statements express the wish to continue being in contact with 
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Catholic organizations, monastic orders, scientific and social institutions. And in fact these 
contacts are indeed continuing. The Russian church sends scholarship recipients to Catholic 
theological institutions of higher learning; in July 2002 one of the regular meetings of the ROC 
with the Catholic peace movement, Pax Christi, took place in Brussels. Metropolitan Kirill 
participated in it and took this opportunity to meet for conversation with Cardinal Danneels of 
Mecheln and Brussels. The bishopric of Hildesheim (Germany) ran a camp in Byelorussia for 
Catholic and Orthodox youth, and voices in the Catholic Church that pose questions about 
financial and charitable help for the ROC remain marginal, thank God. Still, the problem of 
official relations between the churches persists at the highest levels. 
 The prospects for amelioration of relations will depend to a large extent on whether it is 
possible to find a common language for many of the controversial points of dispute. Up to this 
point, correspondence is largely characterized by misunderstandings and widely different 
concepts. Just as people in Moscow either do not know or misunderstand many fundamental 
assumptions and elements of the Catholic Church, so essential aspects of Russian Orthodoxy are 
unknown to many decision-makers at the Vatican. Additionally, there are different factions in 
both churches with divergent interests. It is well known that in the ROC there is tension 
concerning ecumenism between those who are open to it (but as a rule still do not approve of the 
decision of the Vatican) and those who reject it. Likewise in Rome (and also in the Catholic 
Church in Russia) there are differing tendencies. One group is prepared to insist upon the 
correctness of the Catholic position, while another is more characterized by consideration for 
Russian Orthodoxy. A meeting between the Pope and the Patriarch of Moscow that John Paul II 
wants and that was definitely planned once already, is not definitively rejected by Moscow, but it 
is tied to an improvement in relations between the two churches. A Papal visit to Moscow, 
strongly desired by the Catholic Church there (and up until now also by President Putin, who 
seems to have stepped back a bit from this position in view of recent events), would have fatal 
consequences for the future of good relations, if it were carried out against the wishes of the 
Orthodox Church. It would also cause enormous  ecumenical harm, quite apart from the question 
of the Pope’s right to visit Catholics, and quite apart from the wish of a local church to see the 
Pope in its midst. 
 Therefore, all of this means the following: the Catholic Church for its part should try to 
avoid any activity that can be viewed by the ROC as further expansion.  The Catholic Church 
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should inform the ROC in a timely and deliberate way of any steps it undertakes. It should use 
and extend the presently existing channels as well as possibilities of cooperation on other levels 
than those of highest church leadership. Naturally, it is also desirable and necessary that the ROC 
change some of its positions. But it cannot be a matter for the Catholic side to ask for such a 
thing. It must come from Orthodoxy itself. In this regard, expansion of present relations should 
have first priority. 
 The Catholic Church already has a self-defined duty in regard to its conduct in Russia, 
namely, the document entitled “General Principles and Practical Norms for the Coordination of 
Evangelization and Ecumenical Efforts of the Catholic Church in Russia and the other Countries 
of the Russian Confederacy.” This document was drafted by a commission that has since been 
dissolved. It was called “Pro Russia.” But in practice the document has not been observed. That 
is all the more regrettable because the text addresses important and fundamental principles which 
could contribute to creating an atmosphere of trust between the two churches. It could be 
especially important if it were possible for the Catholic Church to turn these principles into 
practical realities in its activities in Russia. This could serve as a sign for the ROC that while the 
Catholic Church is not interested in diminution of care for people in its own churches, it is 
prepared for cordial, fraternal, ecumenical relations with the ROC. In this sense the overture 
from the Russian Orthodox Church, that is contained in its statements, despite all reproaches, 
could be accepted by the Catholic Church. This would certainly be a first step towards necessary 
reconciliation. 
Translated from German by Dr. Erlis Wickersham, professor, Rosemont College, Rosemont, 
Pennsylvania. 
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Red Brick Without Onion Towers: Protestant Life in the Russian Enclave of Kaliningrad 
by William E. Yoder 
Bill Yoder is a Berlin-based church journalist who has been devoting extended 
periods of time in recent years to assist in the rebuilding of church life in 
Kaliningrad Region. A frequent contributor to REE for many years, Yoder, an 
American, received his Dr.phil. in Political Science from the Free University of 
Berlin (1991) with a dissertation on the views of Bishop Otto Dibelius about 
German unity. 
 
 There are certain parallels between the present Russian enclave of Kaliningrad 
(Königsberg) and the erstwhile political island of West Berlin. Kaliningrad, roughly 180 km 
from east to west, is larger and poorer than West Berlin was and suffers from indifferent parents. 
The pending acceptance of its only immediate neighbors (Poland and Lithuania) into the 
European Union will lead at least initially to a further isolation of the 
territory. The Cold War is over, yet border crossings into the enclave remain a protracted and 
bureaucratic affair - for which Polish and Lithuanian authorities are no less at fault. Different 
from Berlin is free access to the territory from the Motherland by sea (by ferry from St. 
Petersburg). 
 This region and its population of nearly 1 million may be one of Russia's poorhouses, but 
it has strong geographic pluses. Like East Berlin of yore, it has become a stepping stone to 
Europe's political West. Kaliningrad is located only 600 km. from Berlin; Moscow is twice as 
far. For Russians of German heritage, it is the most attractive locale for sniffing German air 
while remaining solidly within the familiar boundaries of the Russian Federation. Much red 
German brick remains; the onion towers of Russia are 
barely in evidence. The region remains for some Germans a highly emotive, special entity, for it 
was German for 700 years until 1945. Yet virtually all ethnic Germans who reside there now 
have arrived from Soviet Central Asia. Of the approximately 112 Germans - mostly young 
orphans - who were allowed to remain in the territory after 1948, only 12 are still alive. 
 There are also Germans, perhaps numbered in three digits, who have moved back to the 
region from Germany. Most of these are East Prussian-born pensioners. 
 Besides certain German and Polish circles, Lithuanian interests in particular lay claim to 
this terrain. One sign of this is Klaipeda's (Memel's) "Museum of Lithuania Minor" - Lithuania's 
term for most of the region of the Kaliningrad enclave. Soviet authorities had allowed Lithuanian 
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interests to restore the ruined church of Christian Donalitius, a Lutheran pastor and 18th century 
Lithuanian novelist, in Chistiye Prudy 
(Tollmingkehmen). This church in the in the southeastern corner of the Kaliningrad region was 
opened as a Lithuanian museum in 1979. 
 The story of the recovery of church life in the Kaliningradskaya Oblast is a remarkable 
one. As a Soviet military zone and socialist model territory off-limits to Westerners, all public 
church life was forbidden after 1948. For 40 years, believers wanting to attend church were 
forced to travel to Lithuania. Strangely enough, it was the Baptists who were registered first, in 
1967. But it still was not smooth sailing for them: Soon thereafter a meeting house was 
bulldozed because of supposed legal irregularities. Not until 1985 did the Orthodox and 
somewhat later other religious communities such 
as the New Apostolic attain official registration. 
 The most remarkable story of recovery is perhaps the Lutheran one. Since 1989 the 
Propstei Kaliningrad, part of the St. Petersburg-based "Evangelical Lutheran Church in Russia 
and Other States" (ELCROS), has blossomed from 0 to 43 parishes with 3,000 baptized 
members. This has occurred despite the fact that the enclave serves as a turnstile: At least that 
many Lutherans have already emigrated to Germany only to be replaced by new ethnic Germans 
and their families from further East. The 800 "registered" Baptists remaining in the region have 
been seriously weakened by the exodus of their own westward. In contrast to the Baptists or 
Pentecostals, Lutherans have a decidedly German flavor. Most of their services are bilingual, 
they receive major material and personnel support from Germany. 
 The situation of the 18,000 Lutherans in neighboring Lithuania is quite different: The 
competing influences between a liberal German Lutheranism and the confessionalist 
Lutheranism of the US-based Missouri - and Wisconsin - Synod is apparent in Lithuania. Yet 
this divide remains strangely absent from the enclave. This is surely due to the close alliance 
between the parishes of the enclave and Germany. Elsewhere in Russia, competition between 
North American, German and Finnish Lutheran missions has lead to a partial unraveling of 
Lutheran structures. This is especially true in Belarus. Kiev, Ukraine boasts five different 
Lutheran denominations, Novosibirsk, approximately four. 
 In stark contrast to Polish East Prussia, Russian East Prussia remains a land pockmarked 
by church ruins, some of them dating to the Crusader period in the 14th and 15th centuries. Of its 
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224 churches, 158 of them have been completely destroyed or exist only as ruins. The Lutheran 
church regularly uses only one of the original structures: the diminutive and consequently well-
suited Salzburg church in Gusev (Gumbinnen). The 14th-century church at Gvardeyskoye 
(Mühlhausen), where Martin Luther's daughter Margarethe von Kuenheim lies somewhere 
buried, is one of several churches being restored by private German foundations. Parsonages and 
secular buildings of similar size are seen as best-suited to the modest needs of the budding 
Lutheran communities. The Lutherans have constructed only one new church: Kaliningrad's 
grand "Church of the Resurrection" was dedicated in April 1999. 
 Cathedrals have always been a political statement of a people's self-understanding and 
intentions. The massive Orthodox cathedral slowly climbing skyward behind the statue of Lenin 
on Kaliningrad's Victory Square is no exception. Traditional Russians do not regard East 
Prussia's churches as part of a shared European cultural heritage. During tumultuous scenes at a 
Kaliningrad roundtable last November, politicians insisted that "no German cultural monument 
is comparable to the sacrifices which the Soviet Union brought in the war against fascism". 
 The 1991-registered Roman Catholic church, which has strong Polish support and is in 
ethnic terms heavily Polish and Lithuanian, seems particularly well-organized. Its prefabricated, 
plywood chapels, children's homes and humanitarian projects seem a model of Prussian 
orderliness. They have roughly 15 clerics in the region - probably more than the Orthodox. Their 
strong presence surely supports the continued downward slide of ecumenical relations with the 
Orthodox. Yet worsening ecumenical relations are also a simple reflection of the larger Russian 
trend. 
 Kaliningrad with its population of 450,000 lists seven charismatic and Pentecostal 
congregations: Two better-known ones stem from the Baltimore-based "Greater Grace" mission 
and the Russian "Novoye Pokolenie" (New Generation) denomination. Today's Kaliningrad 
boasts a small Jewish synagogue, a mosque is in the planning stages. 
 Convincing Russians of working age to remain and not continue their trip westward 
remains a formidable challenge to those concerned about the future of the local church. "Rat und 
Tat" (Word and Deed), a fledgling Lutheran initiative for training small entrepreneurs and 
supplying them with loans, is attempting to give local persons an economic reason for staying. 
Without a viable economy, the region's churches - and their members - will remain dependent 
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upon outside sources for continued survival. It is not the "New Russian" economic elite which 
demonstrates an affinity for Protestantism. 
 
